1 Security communities in theoretical perspective
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Scholars of international relations are generally uncomfortable evoking the language of community to understand international politics. The idea that actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interest, diffuse reciprocity, and trust, strikes fear and incredulity in their hearts. This discomfort and disbelief is particularly pronounced when they are asked to consider how international community might imprint international security. Although states might engage in the occasional act of security cooperation, anarchy ultimately and decisively causes them to seek advantage over their neighbors, and to act in a self-interested and self-help manner. The relevant political community, according to most scholars, is bounded by the territorial state, and there is little possibility of community outside of it.

This volume thinks the unthinkable: that community exists at the international level, that security politics is profoundly shaped by it, and that those states dwelling within an international community might develop a pacific disposition. In staking out this position we summon a concept made prominent by Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago: “security communities.”1 Deutsch observed a pluralistic security community whenever states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community, which, in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war. In short, Deutsch claimed that those states that dwell in a security community had created not simply a stable order but, in fact, a stable peace.

Deutsch’s observations of forty years ago seem particularly relevant at the present moment because of changes in global politics and international relations theory. Ever since the end of the Cold War,
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policymakers have been offering various statements on and blueprints for engineering a more peaceful and stable international order. Perhaps this is to be expected; the ends of wars have almost always invited a flurry of commentary on the world that is being left behind and hopeful speculation on the world that should be created in its place. But what is unexpected is that many state officials are pointing to social forces and state interventions nearly identical to those remarked by Deutsch— the development of shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows to encourage community-building— to conceptualize the possibility of peace. Many seasoned policymakers and hardened defense officials are marrying security to community in new and unanticipated ways: they identify the existence of common values as the wellspring for close security cooperation, and, conversely, anticipate that security cooperation will deepen those shared values and transnational linkages. Security is becoming a condition and quality of these communities; who is inside, and who is outside, matters most.

By marrying security and community, moreover, states are revising the conventional meanings of security and power. Some states are revising the concept of power to include the ability of a community to defend its values and expectations of proper behavior against an external threat and to attract new states with ideas that convey a sense of national security and material progress. Thus, as the meaning and purpose of power begins to shift, so, too, does the meaning and purpose of security. Whereas once security meant military security, now states are identifying “new” security issues that revolve around economic, environmental, and social welfare concerns and have ceased to concern themselves with military threats from others within the community. There is emerging a transnational community of Deutschtan policy-makers, if you will, who are challenging the once nearly hegemonic position of realist-inspired policy-makers and offering an alternative understanding of what is possible in global politics and a map to get there.²

Scholars, too, seem to have finally caught up to Deutsch’s vision. Looking into the possible, some are departing significantly from realist-based models to understand the present and future security debates; looking into the past, others have noted that the realist paradigm is better realized in theory than in practice, that states are not as war-prone as believed, and that many security arrangements once assumed to derive from balancing behavior in fact depart
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significantly from realist imagery. Accordingly, Deutsch’s suggestion that states can overcome the security dilemmas and recurring fear assumed by realist theories is less shocking than it once was, and his understanding that the causal mechanisms for this outcome could be found in the development of social networks and the quickening of transnational forces is consistent with the return by some international relations theorists to sociological models. The concept of community represents a direct challenge to the models of security politics that have dominated the discipline for the past several decades, and demands that we take seriously both sociological theorizing and the social character of global politics. Simply put, the issue is not whether there is such a thing as an international community, but rather: when does it matter, where does it matter, and how does it matter?

Our nostalgia for security communities, therefore, is driven by changes occurring in, and theories of, international politics; both represent damaging blows to a realist paradigm that has dominated how policymakers and scholars alike think about international politics. Yet our nostalgia does not drive us toward romanticism. Notwithstanding the tremendous admiration we have for Deutsch’s scholarly and political vision, his conceptualization of security communities was fraught with theoretical, methodological, and conceptual difficulties. Therefore, our resuscitation of Deutsch’s concept of security communities after decades of neglect and criticism is intended both to draw attention to the concept’s importance for understanding contemporary events and to suggest refinements of his initial formulation in order to generate a viable research program.

This volume aspires to demonstrate the empirical and theoretical viability of a research agenda founded on the concept of security communities. Deutsch distinguished between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities: while both have dependable expectations of peaceful change, the former exists when states formally unify, the latter when states retain their sovereignty. Our concern is with pluralistic security communities because it is this form that is theoretically and empirically closest to the developments that are currently unfolding in international politics and international relations theory. This volume sets forth a framework for approaching the study of security communities and then explores that framework in places where a security community is generally understood to exist, in places where scholars have identified trace elements, and even in some places where few would think to look. The theoretical and
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empirical contributions have the collective goal of: better identifying the conditions under which security communities are likely to emerge; focusing on the relationship between transnational forces and interactions, state power, and security politics in ways that depart from traditional realist readings of security politics; harnessing the conceptual architecture of a security community to offer an alternative look at regional interactions and their relationship to security practices; and using the rich case material to identify future directions for the security communities research agenda. In short, this volume represents not the final word but rather the first sustained effort to lay firm foundations for the study of security communities.

In this introductory chapter we do three things. First, we briefly discuss the origins of the concept of security community and situate that concept within the corpus of Karl Deutsch’s intellectual thought. We then concisely survey different theoretical approaches to the conceptualization of a “stable peace.” Various theories of international relations offer an explanation for the absence of war between states; most of these perspectives rely on the language of force or the establishment of institutions to maintain a stable peace. The Deutschian contribution is to highlight that states can become embedded in a set of social relations that are understood as a community, and that the fabric of this community can generate stable expectations of peaceful change. We conclude by providing an overview of the contents of this volume.

Origins of a concept

The concept of security community was always more celebrated than investigated. Initially proposed in the early 1950s by Richard Van Wagenen,4 it was not until the pioneering 1957 study by Karl Deutsch and associates that the concept of security communities received its first full theoretical and empirical treatment. In their study, a security community was defined as a group of people that had become integrated to the point that there is a “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” Security communities, they observed, come in two varieties. An amalgamated security community exists whenever there is the “formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation.”5 Deutsch offers the
United States as an instance. Alternatively, a pluralistic security community “retains the legal independence of separate governments.” These states within a pluralistic security community possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, and mutual responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of “we-ness,” and are integrated to the point that they entertain “dependable expectations of peaceful change.” It is a matter of sociological curiosity that in their quest for “social laws” that rule the relationship between integration and peace, Deutsch and his colleagues stumbled upon “half-baked” integrative processes that offered “a more promising approach to the elimination of war over large areas.”

At the heart of Deutsch’s “pluralistic,” “cybernetic,” or “transactionalist” approach was the assumption that communication is the cement of social groups in general and political communities in particular. “Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together.” Moreover, communication processes and transaction flows between peoples become not only “facilities for attention” but factories of shared identification. Through transactions such as trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and the use of physical communication facilities, a social fabric is built not only among elites but also the masses, instilling in them a sense of community, which becomes

a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we feeling,” trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior ... in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision making.

To measure this “sense of community,” Deutsch and his associates quantified transaction flows, with particular emphasis on their volume, within and among nation-states. A relative growth in transaction flows between societies, when contrasted to flows within them, was thought to be a crucial test for determining whether new “human communities” might be emerging.

Deutsch’s “transactionalist” perspective, which takes seriously the possibility of community, offers an alternative understanding of international politics. Deutsch hypothesized that many of the same processes that led to national integration and nationalism in domestic politics might be equally relevant for international politics and inter-
national community development. This simple move was actually quite radical, placing him at odds with how international relations theory generally evaluates the international system. Whereas most international relations theories use material forces, the language of power, and a very thin conception of society to understand interstate outcomes, the Deutschian perspective relies on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment. Yet Deutsch is not arguing that all interstate interactions can be characterized as transpiring within the same international environment. After all, states are embedded in different environmental contexts, and some interactions occur within a thick social environment and others in a world that approximates that envisioned by neo-realism. Therefore, it is important to problematize what most international relations theories assume: that the context of interstate interaction can be situated within one model of the international environment.10

Deutsch attempts to connect the development of international community to a transformation of security politics. Specifically, he locates the dynamics for peaceful change as the result of a transformation at the international and the individual level. At the international level, community formation is transforming the very character of the states system—some states are integrated to the point that peaceful change becomes taken for granted. By making this move, Deutsch challenges international relations theory’s general reliance on atomistic models of interstate behavior, and forwards the central role of transnational forces in transforming the behavior, if not the very identities, of states. At the level of the individual, community formation leaves its mark on the development of a “we-feeling,” trust, and mutual responsiveness, suggesting that transnational forces have altered the identities of peoples. The transmission belt of values, in other words, is located at the interstate and transnational levels. By daring to contemplate the possibility of community, Deutsch reminds us of how a sociological spirit can enrich our understanding of international politics and international security.

Despite its potential theoretical and practical importance, the concept of security community never generated a robust research agenda.11 Deutsch’s conceptualization of security communities contained various theoretical, conceptual, and methodological problems that undoubtedly scared off future applications. Deutsch looked to transactions as the source of new identifications, but his emphasis on quantitative measures overlooked the social relations that are bound
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up with and generated by those transactions. His commitment to behavioralism, in these and other ways, overwhelmed the demand for a more interpretive approach at every turn. And because his model was generally inattentive to international organizations and to social groups or classes, decision-makers, business elites, and the mixture of self-interest and self-image that motivates their behaviors, he was inattentive to the complex and causal way in which state power and practices, international organizations, transactions, and social learning processes can generate new forms of mutual identification and security relations.12

Another reason why the security community project failed to generate a following way was because scholars began adopting new theories and concerning themselves with new research puzzles that shifted the ground away from it. Increasingly scholars interested in ideas of regional integration and international cooperation used the vehicles of international interdependence, and, later, international regimes. Moreover, any talk of a community of states, not to mention a security community, seemed hopelessly romantic and vividly discordant against the backdrop of the Cold War and the prospect of nuclear war. Quickly distancing themselves from the sociological spirit of these studies, the discipline became enamored with structural realism, rational choice methods, and other approaches to political life that excluded identities and interests as phenomena requiring explanation. Deutsch’s study was often cited but rarely emulated.

Between the “logic of anarchy” and the “logic of community”

It is a sign of the times that sociological theorizing and Deutsch’s concept of security communities have become fashionable once again. That this is so can be attributed not only to the end of the Cold War but also to developments in international relations theory that are exploring the role of identity, norms, and the social basis of global politics. The manner of this sociological resurgence and return to the concept of security communities, however, suggests not simply “old wine in new bottles” but rather new theoretical developments that conceivably enable scholars to overcome some of the conceptual and methodological difficulties that undermined Deutsch’s arrested research program of thirty years ago. Chapter 2 draws on these
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theoretical developments to offer a reformulated conceptual apparatus for the study of security communities. Our immediate task is to provide a brief survey of this emerging sociological disposition and its relationship to Deutsch’s focus on peaceful change.

Theories of international relations that explain the absence of war can be categorized according to whether they see structure as comprised of material forces alone or of material and normative forces:

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  Structure as material
  Neo-realism
  Neo-liberal institutionalism
  Society of states  Absence of war
  Kantian perspectives
  Constructivism

  Structure as material and normative
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Viewed visually, international relations theories can be arrayed on a continuum depending on how “social” they conceive the international environment as being. On one end is realism, which assumes that the structure of international politics is defined by the distribution of power and thus a highly asocial environment, and observes a series of discrete, exchange relations among atomistic actors. On the other end is constructivism’s recognition that international reality is a social construction driven by collective understandings, including norms, that emerge from social interaction. Constructivism, therefore, holds the view that international actors are embedded in a structure that is both normative and material (that is, contains both rules and resources), and allows for the possibility that under the proper conditions actors can generate shared identities and norms that are tied to a stable peace. Below we briefly consider their position vis-à-vis the possibility of the absence of war in general and stable peace in particular.

Neo-realist and realist theories stress the notion that while war does not take place all the time, like rain, it is always expected. If war does not occur, it is because balances-of-power, alliances, hegemonies, and deterrence are able to prevent it, though only temporarily. Stephen Walt explicitly rejects the proposition that states might overcome the fears and dynamics associated with anarchy, and argues that it is
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unclear how a shared “civic identity” will inhibit conflict. Groups sharing similar traits and values are hardly immune to discord: indeed, “family quarrels” are often especially bitter and difficult to resolve. “Shared identity” is a weak reed on which to rest a forecast in any case, given the malleability of changing loyalties and the speed with which they can change.14

By beginning with the assumption of anarchy and that states are driven by self-interest as defined by military security, neo-realists hold that the absence of war can be only temporary and solely attributable to material considerations.15

Neo-liberal institutionalism and the “English school” focus on how states construct institutions to encourage cooperation and to further their mutual interest in survival, respectively.16 Those neo-liberal institutionalists who cut their teeth on integration dynamics in general and Europe in particular have once again picked up many of the themes once explored by Deutsch and other early integrationists.17 Although neo-liberal institutionalists are focusing on many of the same variables discussed by Deutsch, their general commitment to how self-interested actors construct institutions to enhance cooperation prevents them from considering fully how: a community might be forged through shared identities rather than through pre-given interests and binding contracts alone; or, interstate and transnational interactions can alter state identities and interests. While neo-liberal institutionalism shares with neo-realism the assumption of anarchy, it is more interested in how self-interested states construct a thin version of society through the guise of institutions and regulative norms in order to promote their interests.

Although Hedley Bull, the dean of the English School, once portrayed security communities as “pregnant with implications of a general international relations,”18 the English School generally focused not on peaceful change but rather on the norms of society of states, which includes sovereignty and admits balancing behavior and conflicts, that create an “anarchical society.” Still, some who follow the English school have recently been flirting with the concept of security communities; specifically, they have resurrected the concept to imagine “islands” of international society that achieve the status of “mature anarchy”19 or “zones of peace”20 due to their high interaction capacity and dense networks of common rules and institutions. In short, they are interested in how the society of states (or, more specific, certain states) might “upgrade” its norms from the recognition of each

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other’s right to survival (which does permit the occasional war) to the normative prohibition against, and the empirical decline of, war. In many respects, these scholars are moving fairly close to Deutsch’s position, though still weighting their equation toward interstate interactions and away from transnational forces.21

The burgeoning literature on the “pacific thesis” – that democratic states do not wage war among each other – revives classic liberalism and Kantian Republicanism, and attempts to trace how international trade and domestic politics, respectively, affects foreign policy orientation.22 As one leading interpreter of the Kantian perspective observed:

to use or threaten to use force is not usually normatively acceptable behavior in disputes among democracies … Relations between democracies therefore fit into the category of “security community” … in which states not only do not fight each other, they do not expect to fight each other, or significantly prepare to fight each other.23

Frequenting their arguments are a combination of both rationalist and normative claims concerning the incentives and restraints on state leaders by their societies and the international system. However, they limit their analyses to democracies who are assumed to possess certain essentialized qualities and therefore omit from their purview the possibilities that a stable peace might also emerge among non-democracies.

Constructivist scholars have been most prominent in resurrecting Deutsch’s concept of security community: urging that international relations scholarship recognize the social character of global politics; forwarding the need to consider the importance of state identities and the sources of state interests; suggesting that the purposes for which power is deployed and is regarded as socially legitimate may be changing; and positing that the cultural similarities among states might be shaped by institutional agents. Consequently, constructivist scholarship is well-suited to consider how social processes and an international community might transform security politics.24

This is not the place to detail the constructivist ontology, epistemology, and methods. Here it will suffice to say that constructivism, which should be clearly distinguished from non-scientific post-structuralist approaches, takes the social world to be emergent and constituted both by knowledge and material factors. Far from denying a reality to the material world, constructivists claim that how the
material world shapes, changes, and affects human interaction, and is affected by it, depends on prior and changing epistemic and normative interpretations of the material world. In doing so, they have been actively forwarding a theoretical agenda that holds out the possibility for the transformation of global politics as a consequence of changes in domestic, transnational, and interstate forces, and offers an alternative look at security politics and practices.

This abbreviated survey suggests that there are many possible explanations for the absence of war. Neo-realism relies on the language of force and deterrence. Neo-liberal institutionalism, though sharing with neo-realism many key assumptions, takes a more optimistic view because of its attention to the conditions under which states might establish a stable set of norms and institutions to further their shared interests. In this way, neo-liberal institutionalism and the English School share some key traits, though the willingness of some scholars to contemplate the presence of a global society that runs beneath or beside an international society introduces the possibility of community and a more sociological flavor. The Democratic Peace literature has by definition coupled the absence of war to a particular type of state and thus has narrowed considerably the Deutschian framework. The concept of security communities posits the possible relationship between the growth of a community and pacific relations, and offers a more exacting and demanding explanation of a stable peace, but also more fully opens up the sociological bottle.

The Deutschian challenge and promise is to conceptualize international politics as holding out the possibility of international community and to consider how it might imprint international security. By doing so it raises a number of defining issues concerning how we think about, approach, and study international relations theory and security politics. First and perhaps most controversially, it dares to contemplate the possibility of international community. While much of international relations theory has a difficult time doing so because of the assumption that the boundaries of community are both filled and limited by the borders of the state, as Charles Tilly reminds us in this volume, world politics have always had differing forms of transnational networks that can be reasonably understood as international communities. To recognize this possibility, however, requires a willingness not only to look beyond the state for forms of political community and association (after all, realist thought assumes
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a political community but presumes that it is exhausted by the state's territorial borders) but also to adopt a sociological spirit.

Secondly, the study of security communities demands an examination of the relationship between transnational forces, state power, and security politics in novel ways. The growing transnational literature has been examining how and under what conditions transnational forces shape interstate practices and international politics, but heretofore has generally shied away from the "meatier" side of international politics, that is, security. To make the connection between growing transnational networks and transformations in security practices, however, requires taking state power seriously. While various duties and domains might be slowly pried from the hands of the state in this era of diminishing sovereignty and downsizing, the provision of external security rest securely in its grasp. The issue at hand, therefore, is to focus on state power without overshadowing the presence of transnational forces that might encourage states to adopt a different security architecture.

Thirdly, the Deutschian focus on transactions brings us squarely back to processes and interactions: interactions between societies and interactions between states. Although much of international relations theory focuses on structure to understand enduring patterns, Deutsch focused on processes and interactions that emerged between states and societies to understand historical change. Transactions and interactions, he suggested, generate reciprocity, new forms of trust, the discovery of new interests, and even collective identities. The essays in this volume illustrate how the study of security communities must focus on how strategic and patterned interactions between states and societies can represent the wellspring of new normative structures, identities, and interests that are more collective and less particularistic.

Fourthly, the study of security communities has implications for our theories of international politics as it demands a willingness to overcome the stale and artificial realist–idealist divide. By examining the dynamic relationship between state power, international organizations and institutions, and changes in security practices, the study of security communities offers a blend of idealism – which recognized state interests but also envisioned the possibility of progress and a promise for institutions in helping states overcome their worst tendencies – and realism, whose main proponents saw the worst but continued to write about the conditions under which there might be
peaceful change and new forms of political organization. Theories of international politics, therefore, can and should occupy a pragmatic middle ground between the view that identities and international practices cannot change, and the view that everything is possible. They should be able to blend power, interests, and pessimism with norms, a dynamic view of international politics, and moderate optimism about the possibility of structural change that enhances human interests across borders.29

Such considerations, in our view, are consistent with and contribute to the constructivist research program – though we want to emphasize that not everyone in the volume would place themselves in this camp. States are still attentive to their interests and their power. But what state interests are or become, and the meaning and purpose of power, take shape within – and are constituted by – a normative structure that emerges and evolves due to the actions and interactions of state and non-state actors. The “problem of order” in international affairs, therefore, might be better addressed by situating norms alongside the realist presumption of force. Said otherwise, by exploring the relationship between structure, social interactions, and the possible transformation of that structure that leaves its mark on security practices, the security community research program can be seen as an effort to enrich, and provide further evidence of the potential insights of, the constructivist approach to international relations.

**Understanding security communities**

This volume aspires to demonstrate the conceptual dexterity of the concept of security community, to use this concept to investigate the historical experiences of different regions and different time periods, and to use these historical cases to reflect on and further refine the security community research agenda. Therefore, the volume attempts to cover as much territory – geographic, historical, and conceptual – as possible. But not everything could be included in one volume.

The case selection was motivated by three defining criteria. First, we desired to assemble a fairly representative geographical sample, one that moved the scope of the study of security communities away from its traditional Northern Atlantic focus and toward non-Western regions. Said otherwise, the concept of security community has been tied to the pioneering locale, and we desired to discover whether this concept “travels”30 and how other historical regions demonstrate
alternative patterns and dynamics that can contribute to and complicate our knowledge of security communities. To that end, there are chapters on: Southeast Asia, which is frequently identified as a possible security community in a non-democratic context; South America, whose remarkable century-long record of rather pacific interstate relations predates the European security community and broadens our understanding of the normative and material factors involved in the development of security communities; US-Mexican relations, which suggests the possibility of a security community in a highly asymmetrical setting; and the Gulf Arab states, which is better understood as a paragon of realism than as an instance of community, but nevertheless identifies some conditions that might foster the development of a security community. In general, our desire is to contribute to the fields of international relations theory and security studies by demonstrating how the concept of security community helps us to understand the security politics in different regions. To achieve that goal requires not an exhaustive region-by-region search but rather a regional and historical sampling.

Secondly, we desired to get a sample of regions that conceivably were at different phases in the development of a security community. We include some regions that are uncontested security communities – Europe and North America; others that are perhaps at half-way points – the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); and still others that show some signs but are generally understood as laboratories for realism – the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). By examining different regions in terms of their phase in the development of a security community, we can begin to compare the unfolding of a security community on developmental grounds. In doing so, there is no assumption that there is a single pathway or series of phases that states must hurdle to construct a security community. But it makes good methodological sense at the early stages of a research program to proceed abductively and with some well-defined benchmarks to generate some tentative comparisons. In short, this volume looks for a geographical representation and a conceptual sampling.

Thirdly, by forwarding the cases of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations, we begin to consider how international organizations might contribute to the development of regional and global security communities. States are not the only actors in international politics, and international organizations are increasingly active in asserting their own
which main aimly to develop transnational linkages, to form region-
alyzed identities, and to advance the cause of peace. Other regional
organizations that are discussed in this volume, including the Euro-
pean Union, NATO, and ASEAN also further our understanding in
this regard. But the OSCE and the UN are particularly noteworthy
because their officials are quite explicit and self-conscious about their
desire to nurture a transnational community because of its security
implications. Our hope is that this volume provides something of an
intellectual inspiration for other scholars to use the concept of
security communities for regions and dimensions that we do not
cover.

In chapter 2 Adler and Barnett outline the conceptual foundations
of a security community. To begin to meet the Deutschian challenge
and fulfill its promise requires better specifying the conditions under
which the development of a transnational community might translate
into pacific relations. We detect many more proclamations of security
communities in recent years than we think are warranted, and part of
the task is to separate the wheat from the chaff and to better assess
empirically and theoretically when and under what conditions secu-
ritv communities are likely to emerge. To this end we proceed in
three parts. We begin with an examination of a host of concepts,
including international community and dependable expectations of
peaceful change, that are central to the security community research
enterprise. This conceptual stock-taking and reformulation is intended
to overcome some of the problems of Deutsch’s original design. We
then present a framework for the study of the emergence of security
communities that is analytically organized around three “tiers”: (1)
precipitating conditions; (2) process variables (transactions, organi-
sations, and social learning) and structural variables (power and know-
ledge); and (3) mutual trust and collective identity. The positive and
dynamic interaction between process variables and structural vari-
bles undergirds the development of trust and collective identity
formation, which, in turn, drives dependable expectation of peaceful
change. Afterwards we present a heuristic model of three phases in
the development of a security community – “nascent,” “ascendant”
and “mature” and their corresponding indicators. This framework
guides and provides a critical benchmark for the essays in this
volume.

Ole Wæver opens the empirical studies with an analysis of the
“classic” security community: Western Europe. Wæver contends that
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Western Europe became a security community as a consequence of “desecuritization,” a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues. He captures this transformation through the concept of a “speech act” – that security refers to the enunciation of something as security – and examines how the development of collective identity and community came through a process of discursive self-formation. Indeed, Western Europe has become a post-sovereign, neo-imperial entity, made of a European Union core and several concentric political circles around it. Thus, what began as an effort to exclude war in Western Europe, ended up as a “multiperspectival” entity. But Waever suggests that a security community that can be constructed can also be deconstructed. He points to two bits of evidence: there are emergent processes of resecuritization that are a consequence of Europeans transforming integration into a matter of security and, consequently, disintegration a matter of insecurity; because the security community was socially constructed from the state outward, different states incorporated different and potentially contradictory constitutive meanings of “Europe” into their own national identities.

In chapter 4 Emanuel Adler examines the OSCE’s security community-building functions and highlights how its activities and practices are working to spread new norms and establish collective transnational identities and mutual trust. Although the OSCE region, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, is not a security community, Adler contends that the OSCE’s legacy resides in its innovative norms and trust-building practices. These norms and practices helped to bring the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion, and since the end of the Cold War they constitute a new model of “comprehensive,” “indivisible,” and “cooperative” security that grounds dependable expectations of peaceful change on “mutual accountability,” shared identity, and mutual trust. An important feature of these developments is what Adler calls “seminar diplomacy,” which integrate academic expertise and diplomatic discourse. Seminar diplomacy has become one of the OSCE’s main instruments for transnational dialogue, and a principal mechanism for teaching norms and practices of cooperative security that allow state elites and civil societies to identify with each other and construct common understandings. It is noteworthy that other European and non-European organizations have begun to emulate the OSCE’s practices and institutional reforms in order to foster cooperative security, trust, and common understandings.
The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, argue Michael Barnett and F. Gregory Gause III in chapter 5, would never be mistaken for a security community. But the concept of security community sheds some light on the GCC, and the GCC illuminates some subterranean processes associated with security communities. First, given the similarities among the member states and their common security agenda, more progress in community-building could have been expected. Among the various reasons why cooperation failed to deepen is because these states could not create common expectations concerning non-interference in each other’s domestic politics. Secondly, what began as an organization that denied its security function soon turned into a multifaceted entity that was an agent and result of many of the processes and developments that are associated with a security community. Specifically, while at the level of interstate cooperation the history of the GCC is less than glorious, at the level of transnational cooperation and transactions there developed a bustling and increasing traffic that, they argue, is traceable to the existence of the organization. At the level of the regime these countries made some modest moves toward a deepening of interstate cooperation, but seemingly always blocked if not undone by mistrust and suspicion. At the level of societies and transnationalism, however, there have been considerable developments that suggest sustained and deepened cooperation and mutual identification that are detectable in the emergence of a “khalijin” (literally, “residents of the Gulf”) identity. Barnett and Gause cannot predict whether and how this increasingly salient Gulf identity will translate into interstate behavior and dependable expectations of peaceful change, but they do suggest that an important condition for a security community has been fostered by the GCC.

In chapter 6 Amitav Acharya examines the Association of South East Asian Nations. That the members of ASEAN have managed to settle their disputes without the resort to violence for the last three decades has encouraged various scholars of the region to proclaim it a security community. Acharya finds that this claim is unwarranted; nevertheless, he concludes that the solid foundations for a security community have been built. But the case of ASEAN raises some additional concerns regarding the study of security communities. Perhaps most pressing is the presumption that security communities are possible only among liberal states. But the ASEAN states, Acharya notes, have been able to undertake a community-building project
without liberalism; therefore, he interrogates whether liberalism is a necessary condition for security communities. Moreover, there is a growing ASEAN identity that represents a potential source of collective identity. The ASEAN case also points to the importance of domestic rather than systemic security concerns, and shows how this internal security dynamic led to a particular set of ASEAN practices. To this end, region-building was a highly self-conscious exercise determined not only to increase economic and political transactions but also to encourage elite socialization in order to manage conflict. Acharya then identifies the various factors that have contributed to collective identity formation, including the importance of conflict resolution as an identity-conferring practice.

Is South America a security community? South America has had relatively few wars over the last century, and such accomplishments have led many to speculate whether and why it is a security community. In chapter 7 Andrew Hurrell evaluates this claim and focuses on the relations between South America’s principal powers, Brazil and Argentina, spanning three historical periods over the last three decades. Hurrell begins by noting the dramatic shift in relations over the last decade, from rivalry to institutionalized security and economic cooperation. On the security front this cooperation involves, for example, arms control and confidence-building measures; on the economic front it involves, for example, an attempt to integrate the economies of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. While structural constraints and power-based decisions played a role, to understand the development of new identities and interests that were instrumental in producing this shift requires a constructivist approach.

This is so for four reasons. First, most protracted conflicts between Argentina and Brazil took place against a background of shared understandings and established legal and diplomatic institutions that placed a brake on conflict spirals. Secondly, the process of democratization during the second and third periods led Argentina and Brazil to modify their understandings of power, autonomy, and independence in ways that facilitated regional cooperation and imprinted their identities. Thirdly, a shift toward market liberalism in the Southern Cone in the 1980s was accompanied by a collective understanding that only by means of regional association would South America be able to confront the challenges posed by economic globalization and technological change. This realization was also
accompanied by a growing appreciation that regional cooperation and integration may be the key to control nationalism and militarism and, therefore, to maintain domestic peace. Finally, cooperation was also fostered by the emergence of new regional habits of cooperation, such as summit meetings of Heads of State, and the bundling of new security-producing practices to a Latin American identity and democratic practices.

Hurrell believes that stable expectations of non-use of force, non-fortified borders, and institutionalized habits of dialogue between the military establishments of Argentina and Brazil indicate that a security community may already exist between these two states. Moreover, a security community seems to be embedded in an increasingly dense process of economic integration and in the idea of a “club of states” to which only some governments are allowed to belong, and cooperative security becomes the symbol of democratic identity and the end of old rivalries. However, Hurrell cautions that Argentina and Brazil still face many constraints and that, so far, there is little evidence of the kind of “mutual responsiveness” that Deutsch referred to in the past. Although Hurrell considers that Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay are prospective members of the Argentine–Brazilian security community, he also claims that the rest of Latin America is still too anchored in traditional power politics to be understood as a security community.

In contrast to the other essays that study a region or a dyad, in chapter 8 Richard Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal demonstrate how the focus on a single state, Australia, can illuminate some important features of a security community. Specifically, they highlight Australia’s potentially dual identities that derive from the Anglo-American world of Australia’s past and the Asia-Pacific world of Australia’s economic future. Higgott and Nossal argue that Australia is shifting its economic and political interests from the old to the new world, and, therefore, from one security community – the alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States – to another, more nascent, and more ambiguous, community in Asia. As a consequence of Australia’s identity and policy shift, and due to the belief of Australia’s elites that “community” exists in the Asia-Pacific region, policy-makers, and most enthusiastically, Gareth Evans, began to attach an increasing importance to multilateralism, regionalism, and “cooperative security” practices. Yet they also find that Australian elites have difficulty including a security dimension in this relocation;
the Asian states are equally hard-pressed to see Australia as a *bona fide* Asian state and easily amenable to an "Asian Way." Higgott and Nossal conclude that Australia is presently "condemned" to continue in this uncertain condition and that it is unclear whether it will be able to find a home in an Asia-Pacific security community.

In chapter 9 Guadalupe Gonzalez and Stephan Haggard support Deutsch's classic assertion that the United States and Mexico became a security community in the early 1940s. At the same time, this community has been chronically weak because the relationship is not supported by trust and a shared identity; in this respect it does not meet the definition of a security community outlined by Adler and Barnett in chapter 2. According to Gonzalez and Haggard, no security community can emerge between two asymmetrical powers, such as the United States and Mexico, unless it is based on structural convergence – the extent to which the weaker party adopts policies that are conducive to the stronger party. A historical analysis of the United States–Mexican relationship across three different periods demonstrates, however, that convergence showed no linear trend across time or issues. First, and most fundamentally, the relationship suffered from perceptions by the United States that Mexico is politically unstable and thus unreliable. Secondly, the frequent unwillingness and capacity of Mexico to protect the property rights and economic interests of the United States further undermined the relationship. Thirdly, "cross-border externalities" (negative but unintentional consequences that arise from proximity) between the United States and Mexico, such as drug-flows, environmental problems, and immigration, have decreased the level of mutual trust. Finally, despite Mexico's new economic aperture and more cosmopolitan foreign policy, the asymmetry in the bilateral relationship, the vulnerability associated with proximity, high interdependence, and domestic political constraints have all helped to maintain a low level of trust.

NAFTA did little to change this situation. To be sure, NAFTA led to: Mexico's increasing commitment to free trade with the United States and Canada; the creation of a dense network of consultative and dispute-settlement institutions; and the increasingly cooperative ties between subnational governments, private organizations and sectors. Yet NAFTA has no provisions for macroeconomic policy cooperation, did not improve the two countries' segmented cooperation over drug-trafficking and illegal immigration, and has had no
appreciative effect on its increasingly militarized border. Gonzalez and Haggard conclude that although force appears to have been ruled out as a means of settling disputes, the main reason that the United States–Mexican relationship has not sparked the level of trust that is consistent with a security community is that Mexico has not achieved something resembling a modern democratic political form. But, they argue, cooperative relations need not be institutionalized to produce desirable levels of mutual trust; in fact, the historical record suggests that United States–Mexican relations were less conflictual when they were less institutionalized.

In chapter 10 Sean Shore begins his study of US-Canadian relations in a way that would make a realist smile: he notes the power politics that drove the relationship and informed their security practices. But because of various historical circumstances and geopolitical developments – and not because of a sense of community – the US-Canadian border became demilitarized. This demilitarized border then became part of the mythology of their relations, the future symbol of their shared collective identity. In other words, only after a radical change in security relations did there develop a collective identity and a denser network of economic, political, and cultural relations, reversing the presumed logic under which a security community develops. Shore’s analysis of U.S.-Canadian relations offers an excellent example of how demilitarization and the development of stable peace because of structural–realist reasons came prior to the development of shared identity. But once the myth of the “longest unfortified border” took hold, there developed a bustling transnationalism and mutual identification that completed the development of a security community.

In chapter 11 Bruce Russett finds that the United Nations articulates what he calls a neo-Kantian perspective, one that now interweaves a narrative concerning the relationship between democracy, interdependence, and pacific relations. Such a perspective was part of the tradition of the United Nations and many other post-World War II organizations, but it has become particularly pronounced following the end of the Cold War. This neo-Kantian perspective is a tribute not only to the shifting fortunes of geopolitics but also to the civil servants, most notably the former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who articulate a causal relationship between economic interdependence, democracy, and peace. To that extent, UN officials are self-consciously attempting to build democracies, promote economic interdependence, and encourage region-building because of their
supposed relationship to pacific relations. Russett further argues, however, that if the UN is successfully to perform this function then it must overcome its institutional weaknesses and reform the various organs so that they obtain greater legitimacy and authority. Only with a modicum of institutional legitimacy will the UN be able to compel states to follow and adopt the values that it espouses.

In chapter 12 Charles Tilly provides a sociological and historical backdrop to the subject of security communities by briefly unpacking the question of community, the issue of how communities come into existence, and how communities provide for the security of their members. Drawing from the network literature, he provides a sophisticated defense of the use of the concept of community, a concept long thought passé in sociological theory. In doing so, he is able to imagine different types of transboundary communities that have existed over history and can be understood as having created a stable peace.

In the concluding chapter, Barnett and Adler weave the conceptual framework with the various contributions to tease out some general propositions concerning the study of security community, to identify some shortcomings, and to consider some future avenues of research. They conclude by reflecting on how the recognition that security communities are socially constructed offers some guidance for thinking about governing anarchy in theory and practice.

Notes
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5 Deutsch et al., Political Community, p. 6.


7 Deutsch et al., Political Community, pp. 30–31. Ernst Haas similarly argues that “modern nation-states” can be thought of “as communities whose basic consensus is restricted to agreement on the procedure for maintaining order and settling disputes among groups, for carrying out well-understood functions.” Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 39.


9 Deutsch et al., Political Community, p. 36.

10 This is consistent with Robert Powell’s observation that whether states are or are not relative gains seekers is an effect of the structure. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-NeoLiberal Debate,” International Organization 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 337-38. Also see David Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” International Organization 50, 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 1–33.

11 The closest approximations of the security community approach were represented by the regional and integration studies of the period, which elevated the importance of values, learning, and socialization, how separate political communities interacted, merged, and unified. As exemplified in Joseph Nye’s Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), there was an emerging sense that self-identified and selected regions might organize their relations in such a way to promote their self-interests and a sense of collective interest, and even perhaps collective identity. See, also, Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); and Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, eds., “Regional Integration: Theory and Research,” special issue of International Organization 24, 4 (Autumn 1970). These literatures, too, eventually yielded to a barrage of damaging blows. Karl Deutsch himself drew the conclusion that European integration had effectively stopped by 1958. See “Integration and Arms Control in the
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15 Realism should be understood as being much more sophisticated and theoretically supple than is presupposed by many neo-realist interpreters; this is particularly so as the original realist formulations were much more willing to entertain the possibility of a stable peace and the role of international institutions and norms for shaping the behavior of states. Some realists have stressed the notion that diplomatic prudence may momentarily achieve a truce. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, 4th edn (New York: Knopf, 1968). Reinhold Niebuhr saw the creation of a world community realized through daily practices and actions rather than through lofty ideals, and imagined that it would come into existence when there was mutual loyalty and trust rather than mutual dependence. *The World Crisis and American Responsibility* (New York: Association Press, 1950), pp. 80–86. And E. H. Carr opened and closed his pathbreaking *The
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23 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 42.

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Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond.”